Actions, reasons, and causes

Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700 (1963)
Abstract
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as urged by many recent writers
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Citations of this work BETA
Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
David Lewis (1974). Radical Interpretation. Synthese 27 (July-August):331-344.
Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Reasons for Action. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.

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