Belief and the basis of meaning

Synthese 27 (July-August):309-323 (1974)
A theory of radical interpretation gives the meanings of all sentences of a language, and can be verified by evidence available to someone who does not understand the language. Such evidence cannot include detailed information concerning the beliefs and intentions of speakers, and therefore the theory must simultaneously interpret the utterances of speakers and specify (some of) his beliefs. Analogies and connections with decision theory suggest the kind of theory that will serve for radical interpretation, and how permissible evidence can support it
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Knowledge  Meaning  Proposition  Translation  Quine
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Kathrin Glüer (2006). The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
John Haugeland (1990). Dasein's Disclosedness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (S1):51-73.

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