Hypatia 21 (4):58-76 (2006)
|Abstract||: In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an "intuition" that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is "unnatural" rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is "natural," an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called "natural" in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such appeals|
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