Online research in philosophy

In his influential article, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," Donald Davidson defends the claim that "nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (1986, 310). The point of this claim is to deny that beliefs can be justified by, or grounded on "the testimony of the senses: sensation, perception, the given, experience, sensedata, the passing show" (ibid.). Davidson's argument focusses on the case of sensation. While a belief can be justified by the awareness of a sensation, the awareness of a sensation is "just another belief" (311). The sensation itself, the object of the awareness, can stand in a causal relation to a belief but cannot ground, justify or be a reason for it. A number of philosophers have challenged Davidson's view, arguing that sensory or perceptual experiences can be reasons for beliefs. This conclusion has been argued most explicitly and forcefully by John McDowell, who accepts Davidson's point that mere sensations cannot be reasons for beliefs, but holds that experiences can count as reasons for beliefs as long as their content is conceptual.1 Other philosophers have argued that experiences can serve as reasons for belief, but without requiring that they have conceptual content. For some, it is enough that experiences have representational or intentional content.2 Others depart still further from Davidson, holding that any conscious state, even a mere sensation, can serve to justify a belief.3 Typically, philosophers who take these approaches see themselves as broadening the scope of reasons for belief to include other psychological states in addition to beliefs. They grant..

This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e. , the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz. , how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense objects to be criteria for verifying statements made about these objects. Amongst the matters and/or problems, considered philosophically, historically, and scientifically, in the course of the article, are: the kinds of sensible qualities discoverable by us; the problem of “immediate” sensation; an analysis of the intemal process of sensation, investigated in conjunction with insights from Aquinas and today’s science; objective/subjective aspects of sensation; causality in sensation; sceptical positions regarding sensation; the problem of sense error; a critique of Descartes’s assumptions about sensation; a sumrnary of conclusions, based on this examination.

In his influential article, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," Donald Davidson defends the claim that "nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (1986, 310). The point of this claim is to deny that beliefs can be justified by, or grounded on "the testimony of the senses: sensation, perception, the given, experience, sensedata, the passing show" (ibid.). Davidson's argument focusses on the case of sensation. While a belief can be justified by the awareness of a sensation, the awareness of a sensation is "just another belief" (311). The sensation itself, the object of the awareness, can stand in a causal relation to a belief but cannot ground, justify or be a reason for it. A number of philosophers have challenged Davidson's view, arguing that sensory or perceptual experiences can be reasons for beliefs. This conclusion has been argued most explicitly and forcefully by John McDowell, who accepts Davidson's point that mere sensations cannot be reasons for beliefs, but holds that experiences can count as reasons for beliefs as long as their content is conceptual.1 Other philosophers have argued that experiences can serve as reasons for belief, but without requiring that they have conceptual content. For some, it is enough that experiences have representational or intentional content.2 Others depart still further from Davidson, holding that any conscious state, even a mere sensation, can serve to justify a belief.3 Typically, philosophers who take these approaches see themselves as broadening the scope of reasons for belief to include other psychological states in addition to beliefs. They grant..

Prologue : narratocracy and the contours of political life -- From nomos to nomad : Kant, Deleuze, and Rancière on sensation -- The piazza, the edicola, and the noise of the utterance -- Machiavelli's theory of sensation and Florence's vita festiva -- The viewing subject : Caravaggio, Bacon, and the ring -- "You're eating too fast!" slow food's ethos of convivium -- Epilogue : "the photographs tell it all" : on an ethics of appearance.

The sensation of will is not the same thing as the will itself any more than the sensation of hunger is the same thing as being devoid of nutrients. This is not a really surprising claim, but it is the only claim to which Wegner is entitled in his book.

The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a "pleasure sensation" - for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's "feeling episode" theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought into relation to the account of liking one's sensations.

Are sensation ascriptions descriptive, even in the first person present tense? Do sensation terms refer to, denote, sensations, so that truth and falsity of sensation ascriptions depend on the properties of the denoted sensations? That is, do sensation terms have a denotational semantics? As I understand it, this is denied by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a denotational semantics for public language sensation terms, such as.