Externalism and armchair knowledge

In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. pp. 384--414 (2000)
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Abstract

[I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can.

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Citations of this work

The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
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