Externalism and experience

In Ned Block & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press 244-250 (1997)
In this paper, I shall defend externalism for the contents of perceptual experience. A perceptual experience has representational properties; it presents the world as being a certain way. A visual experience, for example, might present the world to a subject as containing a surface with a certain shape, lying at a certain distance, in a certain direction; perhaps a square with sides about 30 cm, lying about one metre in front of the subject, in a direction about 20 degrees to the left of straight ahead
Keywords Experience  Externalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Observation
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Declan Smithies (2016). Perception and the External World. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.

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