Synthese 160 (3):313 - 333 (2008)
|Abstract||It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Søren Overgaard (2008). How to Analyze Immediate Experience:. Hintikka, Husserl, and the Idea of Phenomenology. Metaphilosophy 39 (3):282–304.
Michael Shim (2011). Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology. Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.
Paul Ricœur (1967/2007). Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Northwestern University Press.
Barry Smith (1986). Ontologische Aspekte der Husserlschen Phänomenologie. Husserl Studies 3 (2).
Grant Gillett (1997). Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):331-349.
Michael D. Barber (2008). Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-Conceptual Content. Husserl Studies 24 (2):79-97.
Daniel J. Dwyer (2007). Husserl's Appropriation of the Psychological Concepts of Apperception and Attention. Husserl Studies 23 (2).
Michael Madary (2012). Husserl on Perceptual Constancy. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.
Dan Zahavi (2004). Husserl's Noema and the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Inquiry 47 (1):42 – 66.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads78 ( #10,119 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,270 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?