Husserl and externalism

Synthese 160 (3):313 - 333 (2008)
It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality
Keywords Husserl  Externalism  Disjunctivism  Reality  Horizon  Intentionality
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.

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Citations of this work BETA
Christoph Hoerl (2013). Husserl, the Absolute Flow, and Temporal Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):376-411.
Claude Romano (2012). Must Phenomenology Remain Cartesian? Continental Philosophy Review 45 (3):425-445.
Mattia Riccardi (forthcoming). Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-12.

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