David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 41 (3):703-717 (2013)
Recently, a new problem has arisen for an Anscombean conception of intentional action. The claim is that the Anscombean’s emphasis on the formally causal character of practical knowledge precludes distinguishing between an aim and a merely foreseen side effect. I propose a solution to this problem: the difference between aim and side effect should be understood in terms of the familiar Anscombean distinction between acting intentionally and the intention with which one acts. I also argue that this solution has advantages over an alternative that has already been endorsed in the literature: it is a better fit for the Anscombean theory, and it naturally accommodates intuitions about the moral significance of aiming vs. merely foreseeing
|Keywords||Action Anscombe Deviant formal causation Double effect Intention Reasons|
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References found in this work BETA
Maria Alvarez & John Hyman (1998). Agents and Their Actions. Philosophy 73 (2):219-245.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1982). Medalist's Address. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:12-25.
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Donald Davidson (2001). Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1. Clarendon Press.
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