David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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AI and Society 22 (4):523-537 (2007)
As non-biological machines come to be designed in ways which exhibit characteristics comparable to human mental states, the manner in which the law treats these entities will become increasingly important both to designers and to society at large. The direct question will become whether, given certain attributes, a non-biological machine could ever be viewed as a legal person. In order to begin to understand the ramifications of this question, this paper starts by exploring the distinction between the related concepts of human, person, and property. Once it is understood that person in the legal sense can apply to a non-biological entity such as a corporation, the inquiry then goes on to examine the folk psychology view of intentionality and the concept of autonomy. The conclusion reached is that these two attributes can support the view that a non-biological machine, at least in theory, can be viewed as a legal person
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Ryan Tonkens (2009). A Challenge for Machine Ethics. Minds and Machines 19 (3):421-438.
Ryan Tonkens (2012). Out of Character: On the Creation of Virtuous Machines. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 14 (2):137-149.
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