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  • Martin Davies (1991). Individualism and Perceptual Content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.
    Internalism and Externalism about Experience in Philosophy of Mind
    Externalism and the Theory of Vision in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 111.0Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.
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  • 100.8Frances Egan (1992). Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.
    Externalism and the Theory of Vision in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 97.2Tyler Burge (1988). Individualism and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
    Externalism and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 91.5Lawrence A. Shapiro (1993). Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision. Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.
    Externalism and the Theory of Vision in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 89.3Gabriel Segal (1991). Defence of a Reasonable Individualism. Mind 100 (399):485-94.
    Externalism and the Theory of Vision in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 88.3Martin Davies (1986). Individualism and Supervenience: Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.
    Psychological Explanation in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    Externalism and Psychological Explanation in Philosophy of Mind
    Supervenience in Metaphysics
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  • 86.6Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
    Externalism and the Theory of Vision in Philosophy of Mind
    Externalism and Psychological Explanation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 80.8Denis M. Walsh (1998). Wide Content Individualism. Mind 107 (427):625-652.
    Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way - according to the aetiological theory - individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide content is (...) sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content. (shrink)
    Anomalous Monism in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 80.5Kent Bach & Reinaldo Elugardo (2003). Conceptual Minimalism and Anti-Individualism: A Reply to Goldberg. Noûs 37 (1):151-160.
    No categories
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  • 80.0Martin Rechenauer (1997). Individualism, Individuation and That-Clauses. Erkenntnis 46 (1):49-67.
    Narrow Content in Philosophy of Mind
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