'Strong' self‐deception

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):339-346 (1969)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Even if many instances of reflexive, and even of interpersonal, deception do not involve knowledge or belief of the deceiver to the contrary of the belief he fosters, it is conceivable that some instances could. This is obscured in Stanley Paluch's treatment of self?deception by the dubious contention that one couldn't be self?deceived if one could affirm that one knew (was aware) that P and believed not?P, and that one couldn't be described as knowing P and believing not?P unless one could affirm this (Inquiry, Vol. 10, 1967). The former claim would actually render the affirmation absurd, which it is not; and if it is not, the latter claim is harmless. Whatever can be said of ?self?deception? involving deviant uses of ?know?, the question remains how ?X knows P and believes not?P? could be true given a standard use. The standards of rationality permit one to sustain rival beliefs so long as one does not reflect on all the facts alleged in one of the beliefs. Self?deceit relies on withholding attention not from an unwanted belief as such, as Demos suggests, but from its detailed contents.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Critical notice.Kent Bach - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
Understanding and explaining real self-deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
The product of self-deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
Self-deception.Stanley Paluch - 1967 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):268-278.
Self-deception about emotion.Lisa Damm - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
Self-deception as pseudo-rational regulation of belief.Christoph Michel & Albert Newen - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
21 (#628,100)

6 months
2 (#658,980)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.
Self-deception and shifts of attention.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
Belief and self-deception.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):387-410.
Self-deception needs no explaining.Herbert Fingarette - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):289-301.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Lying to oneself.Raphael Demos - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (18):588-595.
Self-deception.Stanley Paluch - 1967 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):268-278.
Demos on lying to oneself.Frederick A. Siegler - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (August):469-474.

Add more references