II. The Existentialist Critique of Molinism

Comparison of the preliminary objection to Haskar's and Adams's critiques of Molinism. The difficulty with Haskar's 'Power Inference Principle;' Adams's "New Anti-Molinist Argument;" William Lane Craig's recent response to Adams; Craig's defense of the 'emphemeral' Molinist logical possibility of doing otherwise; the two stages of the Existentialist's alternative strategy against Molinism.
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William Lane Craig (1994). Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):857-861.

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