Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of description
Mind and Society 1 (2):87-105 (2000)
| Abstract | Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction . Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. An example of a downward inference is provided and an objection is considered | |||||||||
| Keywords | Language Metaphysics Neuroscience Person Reduction Thought Dennett, D | |||||||||
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