Laws and cause

Dialectica 49 (2-4):263-79 (1995)
Anomalous Monism is the view that mental entities are identical with physical entities, but that the vocabulary used to describe, predict and explain mental events is neither definitionally nor nomologically reducible to the vocabulary of physics. The argument for Anomalous Monism rests in part on the claim that every true singular causal statement relating two events is backed by a law that covers those events when those events are appropriately described. This paper attempts to clarify and defend this claim by tracing out some conceptual relations among the concepts of event, law, and object.
Keywords Anomalous  Cause  Determinism  Law  Metaphysics  Monism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00165.x
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Justin Tiehen (2015). Explaining Causal Closure. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.

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