Minimalism and the Facts About Truth
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth? (2002)
Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate explanation —a move that deprives it from giving support to Minimalism. At the heart of Minimalism lies a theory of truth for propositions. It is called the minimal theory, or MT for short. It consists of a collection of axioms. Each axiom is a proposition of the form..
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Citations of this work BETA
David Liggins (forthcoming). Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv063.
Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
Ryan Christensen (2011). Theories and Theories of Truth. Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43.
Marian David (2008). Quine's Ladder: Two and a Half Pages From the Philosophy of Logic. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):274-312.
Ryan Christensen (forthcoming). McGee on Horwich. Synthese:1-14.
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