Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404 (2005)
|Abstract||Robert Cummins has argued that Jerry Fodor’s well-known systematicity argument begs the question. I show that the systematicity argument for thought structure does not beg the question, nor run in either explanatory nor inferential circles, nor illegitimately project sentence structure onto thoughts. Because the evidence does not presuppose that thought has structure, connectionist explanations of the same interconnections between thoughts are at least possibilities. Butthey are likely to be ad hoc|
|Keywords||Epistemology Language Systematicity Cummins, Robert Fodor, Jerry|
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