On 'truth is good'

Philosophical Books 46 (4):292-301 (2005)
Abstract
As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
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