Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions

History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186 (2009)
Abstract
This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, in responding to a variety of different problems relating to the proposition, chose to resolve these problems in ways that continually made concessions to psychologism
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References found in this work BETA
Richard R. Brockhaus (1991). Realism and Psychologism in 19th Century Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):493-524.

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