Quine's ladder: Two and a half pages from the philosophy of logic
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):274-312 (2008)
| Abstract | I want to discuss, in some detail, a short section from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic. It runs from pages 10 to 13 of the second, revised edition of the book and carries the subheading ‘Truth and semantic ascent’.1 In these two and a half pages, Quine presents his well-known account of truth as a device of disquotation, employing what I call Quine’s Ladder. The section merits scrutiny, for it has become the central document for contemporary deflationary views about truth | |||||||||
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W. V. Quine (1986). Philosophy of Logic. Harvard University Press.
Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
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