Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):452 - 459 (2003)
|Abstract||Dancy argues that reasons are not psychological states, but perceived facts about the world, and shows that the reasons themselves are not causes. Dancy concludes that actions are not explained by beliefs and desires, and that reason explanations are not causal. I show that these further conclusions are unwarranted by sketching an alternative theory according to which what it is for an action to be done for a reason is for certain beliefs and desires to cause it. Our reasons are the contents of those beliefs and desires. This theory is compatible with Dancy's facts, and explains more|
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