David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bioethics 22 (5):258–268 (2008)
For now, the best way to select a child's genes is to select a potential child who has those genes, using genetic testing and either selective abortion, sperm and egg donors, or selecting embryos for implantation. Some people even wish to select against genes that are only mildly undesirable, or to select for superior genes. I call this selection drift– the standard for acceptable children is creeping upwards. The President's Council on Bioethics and others have raised the parental <span class='Hi'>love</span> objection: Just as we should <span class='Hi'>love</span> existing children unconditionally, so we should unconditionally accept whatever child we get in the natural course of things. If we set conditions on which child we get, we are setting conditions on our <span class='Hi'>love</span> for whatever child we get. Although this objection was prompted by selection drift, it also seems to cover selecting against genes for severe impairments. I argue that selection drift is not inconsistent with the ideal of unconditional parental <span class='Hi'>love</span> and, moreover, that the latter actually implies that we should practise selection drift – in other words, we should try to select potential children with the best genetic endowments. My endowment argument for the second claim works from an analogy between arranging an endowment prior to conception to fund a future child's education, and arranging a genetic endowment by selecting a potential child who already has it, where in both cases the child would not have existed without the endowment. I conclude with some programmatic remarks about the nonidentity problem.
|Keywords||designer baby perfect children gene selection preimplantation genetic diagnosis embryo selection potential children nonidentity problem|
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References found in this work BETA
Julian Savulescu (2001). Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children. Bioethics 15 (5-6):413-426.
Dan W. Brock (1995). The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms – the Case of Wrongful Handicaps. Bioethics 9 (3):269–275.
Bonnie Steinbock & Ron McClamrock (1994). When Is Birth Unfair to the Child? Hastings Center Report 24 (6):15-21.
Ron McClamrock (1994). When Is Birth Unfair to the Child? Hastings Center Report 24 (6):15-21.
Stuart Rachels (1998). Is It Good to Make Happy People? Bioethics 12 (2):93-110.
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