David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi. 193-200 (1989)
This summary paper explains why we are not constrained to start from a solipsistic, or first person point of view in considering the nature of thought. My aim here is to suggest the nature of an acceptable extemalism. According to this view, knowledge of other minds need not be a problem m addition to the problem of empirical knowledge. The essential step toward determining the content of someone else's thought is made by discovering what normally causes those thoughts. Hence I believe that there could not be thoughts in one mind if there were not other thoughtful creatures with which the first mind shared a natural world
|Keywords||Epistemology Externalism Knowledge|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Anthony L. Brueckner (2000). Externalism and the a Prioricity of Self-Knowledge. Analysis 60 (1):132-136.
Ted A. Warfield (1997). Externalism, Privileged Self-Knowledge, and the Irrelevance of Slow Switching. Analysis 57 (4):282-84.
Kevin Falvey & Joseph Owens (1994). Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.
Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Can Externalism Be Reconciled with Self-Knowledge? Philosophical Topics 20 (1):233-68.
Sven Bernecker (1996). Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism. Inquiry 39 (1):121-39.
Sven Bernecker (1996). Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.
Sanford Goldberg (ed.) (2007). Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.
Alberto Voltolini (2005). On the Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism. Disputatio 18 (2):1 - 24.
Ted A. Warfield (1992). Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism Are Compatible. Analysis 52 (4):232-37.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #126,172 of 1,413,333 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #67,208 of 1,413,333 )
How can I increase my downloads?