1. Marian David (1997). Two Conceptions of the Synthetic A Priori. In L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm (The Library of Living Philosophers).
    Roderick Chisholm appears to agree with <span class='Hi'>Kant</span> on the question of the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. But Chisholm’s conception of the a priori is a traditional Aristotelian conception and differs markedly from <span class='Hi'>Kant</span>’s. Closer scrutiny reveals that their agreement on the question of the synthetic a priori is merely verbal: what <span class='Hi'>Kant</span> meant to affirm, Chisholm denies. Curiously, it looks as if Chisholm agreed on all substantive issues with the empiricist rejection of <span class='Hi'>Kant</span>’s synthetic a priori. In the end, it turns out that Chisholm disagrees with empiricism and Kantianism over a fundamental question: whether mere understanding of the contents of our thoughts must always remain within the circle of our own ideas or can provide us with genuine knowledge of matters of fact.
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