The problem of armchair knowledge
In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press (2003)
|Abstract||He then argues that (1), (2) and (3) constitute an inconsistent triad as follows (1991, p. 15): Suppose (1) that Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet. Then by (2), Oscar can simply deduce E, using premisses that are knowable a priori, including the premiss that he is thinking that water is wet. Since Oscar can deduce E from premisses that are knowable a priori, Oscar can know E itself a priori. But this contradicts (3), the assumption that E cannot be known a priori. Hence (1), (2), and (3) are inconsistent. McKinsey’s conclusion is that ‘anti-individualism is inconsistent with privileged access’ (ibid.)|
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Similar books and articles
Michael McKinsey (1987). Apriorism in the Philosophy of Language. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):1-32.
Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Martin Davies (2000). Externalism and Armchair Knowledge. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.
Susana Nuccetelli (1999). What Anti-Individualist Cannot Know A Priori. Analysis 59 (59):59-69.
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