Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects
| Abstract | In chapter 6 of Conditionals (1987),1 Jackson distinguishes two purposes of arguing – teasing out and convincing. With respect to the convincing purpose of arguing, he describes a way in which a propounded argument may be ill-suited to its purpose – the argument as propounded may beg the question. Jackson’s account of begging the question is quite different from a more familiar account that can be found, for example, in Irving Copi’s textbook, Introduction to Logic (1961). Copi’s account is, it seems to me, more closely related to the teasing-out purpose of arguing. So we have two purposes of arguing, the teasing-out purpose and the convincing purpose, and, for each purpose, we have a property of arguments that makes an argument ill-suited to that purpose. Both properties are called ‘begging the question’, and the two accounts of begging the question provide principled limitations on the arguments that can properly be used for the respective purposes | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesAnnalisa Coliva (2010). Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.
Thaddeus Metz (2007). God's Purpose as Irrelevant to Life's Meaning: Reply to Affolter. Religious Studies 43 (4):457-464.
Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi (2005). Petitio Principii: What's Wrong? Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Seth Shabo (2011). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.
Allan Hazlett (2006). Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question. Erkenntnis 65 (3):343 - 363.
Juho Ritola (2003). Begging the Question: A Case Study. Argumentation 17 (1):1-19.
Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Naturalizing Intentionality. In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). Begging the Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
David H. Sanford (1972). Begging the Question. Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads21 ( #58,746 of 549,087 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
