The two senses of desire

Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195 (1984)
Abstract
It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1967). Motives and Motivation. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, Macmillan. 5--399.
Robert Audi (1973). Intending. Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):387-403.
Robert Audi (1973). The Concept of Wanting. Philosophical Studies 24 (1):1 - 21.

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Citations of this work BETA
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Eric Lormand (1985). Toward a Theory of Moods. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
Wayne A. Davis (1987). The Varieties of Fear. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):287 - 310.
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