The two senses of desire

Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195 (1984)
It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372477
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References found in this work BETA
T. Nagel (1970). Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press.

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Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Eric Lormand (1985). Toward a Theory of Moods. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
Jing Zhu (2005). Explaining Synchronic Self-Control. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):475-492.

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