Inquiry 37 (4):437 – 440 (1994)
|Abstract||Two questions are raised about Quine's view of truth. He has recently said that ontology is relative to a translation manual: is this the same as relativizing it to a language? The same question may be asked about truth. Should we think there is one concept of truth which is relative to a language, or is there a separate concept for each language (or speaker)? The second question concerns Quine's repeated endorsements of the ?disquotational? account of truth. Does he think this account limits a truth predicate to application to a single language, or can translation (or Tarski's methods) allow us to apply a truth predicate in one language to sentences in other languages? If the latter, can Quine still contend that the disquotational account is a ?full? account of the concept of truth? The answer would tell us whether Quine can be counted among those who would deflate the concept of truth|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Marian David (2008). Quine's Ladder: Two and a Half Pages From the Philosophy of Logic. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):274-312.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.
G. Ebbs (2011). Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention. Mind 120 (478):193-237.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3).
Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1990). Quine's Relativism. Ratio 3 (2):142-149.
Lars Bergström (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421-435.
Lars Bergström (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421 – 435.
Added to index2009-02-04
Total downloads37 ( #32,010 of 551,105 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,242 of 551,105 )
How can I increase my downloads?