David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 37 (4):437 – 440 (1994)
Two questions are raised about Quine's view of truth. He has recently said that ontology is relative to a translation manual: is this the same as relativizing it to a language? The same question may be asked about truth. Should we think there is one concept of truth which is relative to a language, or is there a separate concept for each language (or speaker)? The second question concerns Quine's repeated endorsements of the ?disquotational? account of truth. Does he think this account limits a truth predicate to application to a single language, or can translation (or Tarski's methods) allow us to apply a truth predicate in one language to sentences in other languages? If the latter, can Quine still contend that the disquotational account is a ?full? account of the concept of truth? The answer would tell us whether Quine can be counted among those who would deflate the concept of truth
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1953/1980). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
W. V. Quine (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1981). Theories and Things. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1974/1973). The Roots of Reference. Lasalle, Ill.,Open Court.
Citations of this work BETA
Lars Bergström (2006). Quine's Relativism. Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
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