Proper functionalism: A better alternative?

Religious Studies 34 (2):119-134 (1998)
Abstract In this paper, I develop some internal problems with Alvin Plantanga's proper functionalist epistemology. I focus on: (1) how we know that a belief is the result of proper function and the special difficulties this occasions for religious beliefs; (2) what a properly functioning person should believe in various circumstances, and (3) the problem of design -- whether the claim that God designed us can be reconciled with the claim that He was subject to trade-offs, compromises and unintended by-products. These serious internal problems cast doubt upon proper functionalism's fruitfulness as a theory of knowledge
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