Scope marking: Cross-linguistic variation in indirect
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Overview A scope marking structure is characterized by the fact that it has two clauses, each of which contains wh expressions [CP-1...wh1...][CP-2...wh2(...whn)...]. While wh- 1 is a fixed lexical item, wh-2...wh-n are not. A possible answer to the question seems to specify values not for wh1 but for wh2...whn. In recent years such structures have come under a lot of scrutiny and various analyses have been proposed to account for their properties. In spite of differences in detail, these analyses can be classified into two groups on the basis of the status they accord to the wh expressions. The direct dependency approach treats wh-1 as semantically inert and assigns matrix scope to wh- 2...wh-n. The indirect dependency approach, on the other hand, takes wh-1 to play a crucial role in determining what the question quantifies over. Wh-2...wh-n do not have matrix scope but play an indirect role in matrix quantification because CP-2 forms the restriction of wh-1. Seen in this light, the direct and indirect dependency approaches are not tied to particular syntactic claims about the relation between CP-1 and CP-2. Whether a particular analysis can be characterized as direct or indirect depends solely on the status of the wh expressions at transparent LF, von Stechow’s term for the level of syntactic representation that feeds into the interpretive module
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