David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 33 (3):285 - 296 (1990)
In many applications of physics, boundary conditions have an essential role. The purpose of this paper is to examine from both a historical and philosophical perspective one such boundary condition, namely, the no-slip condition of fluid dynamics. The historical perspective is based on the works of George Stokes and serves as the foundation for the philosophical perspective. It is seen that historically the acceptance of the no-slip condition was problematic. Philosophically, the no-slip condition is interesting since the use of the no-slip condition illustrates nicely the use of scientific models. But more importantly, both the use and justification of the no-slip condition illustrate clearly how theories can holistically approach the world through model construction. Further, since much of the debate over scientific realism occurs in the realm of models, a case is made that an understanding of the role of the no-slip condition has something to offer to this debate.
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References found in this work BETA
Nancy Cartwright (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press.
Ian Hacking (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press.
Ernan McMullin (1985). Galilean Idealization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247-273.
J. D. Sneed (1975). The logical structure of mathematical physics. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (1):151-152.
Wolfgang Stegmüller (1976). The Structure and Dynamics of Theories. Springer-Verlag.
Citations of this work BETA
Andoni Ibarra, Thomas Mormann & Werner Diederich (1994). Bibliography of Structuralism II (1989–1994 and Additions). Erkenntnis 41 (3):403-418.
W. Diederich, A. Ibarra & T. Mormann (1994). Bibliography of Structuralism II. Erkenntnis 41 (3):403-418.
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