Online research in philosophy

Towards the end of eighteenth century in France, the newly acquired rights of people as citizens needed assuring. This article traces the principles through which Condorcet tried to realise this on an institutional level. Condorcet did not view the Enlightenment ideas of progress as primarily referring to the state. Rather, he focused on the rights of individuals, particularly on their right to develop their own potential. He bound this perception with the unconditional demand for recognition of the rights of all people, in particular also for a clear renunciation of any gender-specific interpretation of this fundamental idea. Evidence for this is found in Condorcet’s writings on Instruction Publique. In contrast to other educational programmes of the revolutionary period, these evince a discriminating interpretation of freedom and equality, and recognise the numerous threats to a self-determined human existence.

The “fathers’ rights” movement represents policies that undermine women’s reproductive autonomy as furthering the cause of gender equality. Khader argues that this movement exploits two general weaknesses of equality claims identified by Luce Irigaray. She shows that Irigaray criticizes equality claims for their appeal to a genderneutral universal subject and for their acceptance of our existing symbolic repertoire. This article examines how the plaintiffs’ rhetoric in two contemporary “fathers’ rights” court cases takes advantage of these weaknesses.

The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") has a distinguished track record. Established under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 ("ECHR"), it was the world's first international human rights court. It decides thousands of cases every year, and its opinions are cited world-wide. For most of its history, the Court's jurisprudence on equality was uninspiring, as it was based on a formal conception of equality. In recent years, however, the ECtHR has begun to give equality more substantive content.

In contrast with the common assumption in the plea bargaining literature, we show fairness-related concerns systematically impact defendants' preferences and judgments. In the domain of preference, innocents are less willing to accept plea offers (WTAP) than guilty defendants and all defendants reject otherwise attractive offers that appear comparatively unfair. We also show that defendants who are uncertain of their culpability exhibit egocentrically biased judgments and reject plea offers as if they were innocent. The article concludes by briefly discussing the normative implications of these findings.

Two central issues for ethical analysis of equality are: (1) Why equality? (2) Equality of what? The two questions are distinct but thoroughly interdependent, We cannot begin to defend or criticize equality without knowing what on earth we are talking about, i,e., equality of what features (e,g., incomes, wealths, opportunities, achievements, freedoms, rights)? We cannot possibly answer the first question without addressing the second, That seems obvious enough.

Political activists drive around with bumper stickers proclaiming their commitment to equality. Perhaps the bumper sticker loudly asserts “=!” Oppressed people lament their lack of equality. Political philosophers contemplate equality and try to formulate general principles about it. In recent days, some advocates of marriage rights for same-sex couples argued for their view by claiming it’s just a matter of equality. Indeed, one of their advocacy websites uses the name ‘Equality’.1 They want equal rights. Everyone seems to take it for granted that equality is important. This seems entirely wrong to me. It seems to me that equality is legally (and politically and socially and economically and morally) irrelevant.

Linda Krieger's paper in this volume relies on the concepts of "equal" and "special" rights, and I focus my attention upon the bivalent view of equality which justifies the creation of special rights. Krieger argues, I point out, that equality of effect is a fundamentally more just consideration than equality of treatment, and special rights allow disadvantaged groups to achieve this equality of effect.

This paper forms part of a feasibility study for a Scottish Centre for Equality and Human Rights. This report briefly maps the intellectual terrain, reviewing some of the most important literature on equality and human rights. It traces the historical development of these concepts and examines their impact on policy developments. For example it critically examines the 'capability approach', which has had a strong influence on recent UK policy initiatives.