Glasgow's conception of Kantian humanity

Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 307-314 (2008)
Abstract
In “Kant’s Conception of Humanity,” Joshua Glasgow defends a traditional reading of the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Specifically, he opposes taking good will to be the end in itself, and instead argues that the end in itself must be some more minimal “rational capacity.” Most of Glasgow’s article is directed against some arguments I have given in favor of taking the end in itself to be a good will, or the will of a rational being who is committed to morality. In this response to Glasgow, I both consider Glasgow’s main points, and propose some general strategies for avoiding common interpretive pitfalls in discussing the humanity formulation.
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Joshua Glasgow (2007). Kant's Conception of Humanity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2):291-308.
Joshua Glasgow (2007). Kant's Conception of Humanity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2):291-308.
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