A strawson–lewis defence of social preferences

Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):291-310 (2012)
This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude. Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences and expectations mutually cross-referring. As with a Lewis-norm, the loop can get started in a variety of ways. It is self-sustaining in the sense that people with social preferences have sufficient reason not to deviate
Keywords social preferences  Strawson  Lewis
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267112000259
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References found in this work BETA
Elliott Sober (1983). Equilibrium Explanation. Philosophical Studies 43 (2):201 - 210.

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