Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense
Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201 (2010)
| Abstract | In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology, while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention isn’t necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an argument against the claim that, according to our commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for attention. However, I don’t claim it follows from this argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz. that consciousness isn’t necessary for attention. Instead, I want to motivate the claim that there isn’t such a thing as the view of commonsense psychology about the relation between attention and consciousness. I argue that people’s use of these terms — and, presumably, of their corresponding concepts — seems to be context-dependent. I conclude with a discussion of the possible implications of this claim for the empirical study of attention and consciousness | |||||||||
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Christopher Mole (2008). Attention and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.
Felipe De Brigard (forthcoming). Attention, Consciousness, and Commonsense. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
Carolyn Suchy-Dicey (2012). Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.
Selmer Bringsjord (1997). Consciousness by the Lights of Logic and Commonsense. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):144-146.
Bryce Huebner (2010). Commonsense Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Anyone Care About Functional Zombies? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1).
Sebastian Watzl (2011). Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays.
R. W. Kentridge, L. H. de-Wit & C. A. Heywood (2008). What is Attended in Spatial Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):105-111.
Sebastian Watzl (2011). The Philosophical Significance of Attention. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
Declan Smithies (2011). Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press.
P. Sven Arvidson (1996). Toward a Phenomenology of Attention. Human Studies 19 (1):71-84.
Sebastian Watzl (2010). The Significance of Attention. Dissertation, Columbia University
James Stazicker (2011). Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy. Mind and Language 26 (2):156-184.
Christopher Mole (2008). Attention in the Absence of Consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):44.
Kathleen V. Wilkes (1995). Losing Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
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