A new formulation of the principle of indifference

Synthese 163 (3):329-339 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A consistent restriction of the principle of indifference.Paul Castell - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):387-395.
Should we respond to evil with indifference?Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):613–635.
Formulating the Precautionary Principle.Neil A. Manson - 2002 - Environmental Ethics 24 (3):263-274.
Inductive Analogy in Carnapian Spirit.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:157 - 167.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
450 (#39,058)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The Metaphysics of Chance.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):938-952.
On Bertrand's paradox.Sorin Bangu - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):30-35.
Evidence, ignorance, and symmetry.Tamar Lando - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):340-358.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.

Add more references