Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402 (2006)
|Abstract||Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.|
|Keywords||Presentism Time Relations|
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