Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations

Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
Keywords Presentism  Time  Relations
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00566.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,707
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Sam Baron (2014). The Priority of the Now. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:0-0.
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Sam Baron (2013). Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

242 ( #5,686 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

25 ( #36,765 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.