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Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations

Abstract
Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
Keywords Presentism  Time  Relations
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Merrihew Adams (1986). Time and Thisness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):315-329.
Thomas M. Crisp (2003). Presentism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Sam Baron (2013). Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
Ernâni Magalhães (2011). Presentism, Persistence and Composition. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):509-523.

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