Empirical Negation

Acta Analytica 28 (1):49-69 (2013)
Abstract
An extension of intuitionism to empirical discourse, a project most seriously taken up by Dummett and Tennant, requires an empirical negation whose strength lies somewhere between classical negation (‘It is unwarranted that. . . ’) and intuitionistic negation (‘It is refutable that. . . ’). I put forward one plausible candidate that compares favorably to some others that have been propounded in the literature. A tableau calculus is presented and shown to be strongly complete
Keywords Intuitionistic negation  Empirical negation  Strong negation  Verificationism  Dummett
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    Ernesto Napoli (2006). Negation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):233-252.
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