David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (2005)
When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of identity. Defending a biological view of our numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical: the definition of death; the authority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia; the use of enhancement technologies; prenatal genetic interventions; and certain types of reproductive choices. He demonstrates the power of personal identity theory to illuminate issues in bioethics as they bring philosophical theory to life
|Keywords||Identity (Philosophical concept Identification Human beings Bioethics|
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|Buy the book||$59.95 used (46% off) $102.54 new (7% off) $109.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD236.D44 2005|
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Peter Nichols (2010). Substance Concepts and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.
Patrick Toner (2011). Hylemorphic Animalism. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.
Ineke Bolt & Maartje Schermer (2009). Psychopharmaceutical Enhancers: Enhancing Identity? Neuroethics 2 (2):103-111.
Marya Schechtman (2010). Personhood and the Practical. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):271-283.
David DeGrazia (2010). Is It Wrong to Impose the Harms of Human Life? A Reply to Benatar. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):317-331.
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