Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Forum 38 (1):57–80 (2007)
|Abstract||Regarding the sinking lifeboat scenario involving several human beings and a dog, nearly everyone agrees that it is right to sacrifice the dog. I suggest that the best explanation for this considered judgment, an explanation that appears to time-relative interests, contains a key insight about prudential value. This insight, I argue, also provides perhaps the most promising reply to the future-like-ours argument, which is widely regarded as the strongest moral argument against abortion. Providing a solution to a longstanding puzzle in value theory across species while illuminating the morality of abortion, the time-relative interest account proves worthy of sustained theoretical attention|
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