The harm of death, time-relative interests, and abortion

Philosophical Forum 38 (1):57–80 (2007)
Regarding the sinking lifeboat scenario involving several human beings and a dog, nearly everyone agrees that it is right to sacrifice the dog. I suggest that the best explanation for this considered judgment, an explanation that appears to time-relative interests, contains a key insight about prudential value. This insight, I argue, also provides perhaps the most promising reply to the future-like-ours argument, which is widely regarded as the strongest moral argument against abortion. Providing a solution to a longstanding puzzle in value theory across species while illuminating the morality of abortion, the time-relative interest account proves worthy of sustained theoretical attention
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2007.00253.x
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References found in this work BETA
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971). A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Don Marquis (1989). Why Abortion is Immoral. Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
T. M. Scanlon (1975). Preference and Urgency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):655-669.
John A. Burgess & S. A. Tawia (1996). When Did You First Begin to Feel It? Locating the Beginnings of Human Consciousness? Bioethics 10 (1):1-26.

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