David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bioethics 9 (1):50–61 (1995)
The idea of a patient's best interests raises issues in prudential value theory–the study of what makes up an individual's ultimate good or well‐being. While this connection may strike a philosopher as obvious, the literature on the best interests standard reveals almost no engagement of recent work in value theory. There seems to be a growing sentiment among bioethicists that their work is independent of philosophical theorizing. Is this sentiment wrong in the present case? Does value theory make a significant difference in interpreting best interests? In pursuing this question, I begin with a quick sketch of broad kinds of value theories, identifying representatives that are plausible enough to count as contenders. I then explore what each account suggests in neonatal treatment decisions, and decisions for patients in persistent vegetative states. I conclude that while these accounts converge somewhat in their interpretations of best interests, they also have importantly different implications
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Citations of this work BETA
Dominic James Wilkinson (2011). A Life Worth Giving? The Threshold for Permissible Withdrawal of Life Support From Disabled Newborn Infants. American Journal of Bioethics 11 (2):20 - 32.
D. Wilkinson (2013). Which Newborn Infants Are Too Expensive to Treat? Camosy and Rationing in Intensive Care. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):502-506.
Giles Birchley (2013). Doctor? Who? Nurses, Patient's Best Interests and Treatment Withdrawal: When No Doctor is Available, Should Nurses Withdraw Treatment From Patients? Nursing Philosophy 14 (2):96-108.
R. Huxtable (2013). 'In a Twilight World'? Judging the Value of Life for the Minimally Conscious Patient. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (9):565-569.
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