David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):379-391 (1996)
Here, we analyse some recent applications of set theory to topology and argue that set theory is not only the closed domain where mathematics is usually founded, but also a flexible framework where imperfect intuitions can be precisely formalized and technically elaborated before they possibly migrate toward other branches. This apparently new role is mostly reminiscent of the one played by other external fields like theoretical physics, and we think that it could contribute to revitalize the interest in set theory in the future
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Henri Galinon (forthcoming). Naturalizing Indispensability: A Rejoinder to ‘The Varieties of Indispensability Arguments’. Synthese:1-14.
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