Observational Ecumenism, Holist Sectarianism

Philo 9 (2):165-191 (2006)
Do any significant philosophical differences between Quine and Carnap follow from Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s analytic-synthetic distinction? Not if they both understand empirical evidence in merely observational terms. But it follows from Quine’s rejection of the distinction that empirical evidence has degrees of holophrastic depth penetrating even into logic and ontology (gradualism). Thus his reasons to prefer realism to idealism are holophrastically empirical. I discuss Quine’s holist sectarian realism on private languages, externalism versus internalism, unobserved objects, unobservable abstract entities, bivalence, ecumenicism versus sectarianism, and on gradualism itself
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DOI 10.5840/philo20069213
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