Social understanding through direct perception? Yes, by interacting

Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542 (2009)
Abstract
This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.
Keywords social cognition  interaction process  interaction process  participatory sense-making  direct perception  social interaction  coordination  intersubjectivity  phenomenology  cognitive science
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References found in this work BETA
Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). Participatory Sense-Making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):429-452.

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Citations of this work BETA
Monika Dullstein (2012). The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):231-248.

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