John Buridan's treatise de dependentiis, diversitatibus et convenientiis: An edition
Vivarium 42 (1):109-149 (2004)
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T. Stuart (1993). John Buridan on Being and Essence. In Egbert P. Bos & H. A. Krop (eds.), John Buridan, a Master of Arts: Some Aspects of His Philosophy: Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of its 15th Anniversary, Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 19. Ingenium Publishers.
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2004). Complexio, Enunciatio, Assensus: The Role of Propositions in Knowledge According to John Buridan. In A. Maierù & L. Valente (eds.), Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language. Leo S. Olschki.
David Hume (2007). A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition. Oxford University Press.
J. M. M. H. Thijssen (2004). The Buridan School Reassessed. John Buridan and Albert of Saxony. Vivarium 42 (1):18-42.
Gyula Klima (2009). John Buridan. Oxford University Press.
Ivan Boh (1988). Jean Buridan's Logic. The Treatise on Supposition. The Treatise on Consequences. Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (4):662-664.
Jean Buridan (1982). John Buridan on Self-Reference: Chapter Eight of Buridan's Sophismata, with a Translation, an Introduction, and a Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge University Press.
Jean Buridan (1982). John Buridan on Self-Reference: Chapter Eight of Buridan's Sophismata. Cambridge University Press.
Iohannis Buridani (2004). John Buridan's Treatise de Dependentiis. Vivarium 42 (1):115-149.
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