Online research in philosophy

Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument.

The following questions are addressed concerning how a theory of lexical access can be realized in the brain: (1) Can a brainlike device function without inhibitory mechanisms? (2) Where in the brain can one expect to find processes underlying access to word semantics, syntactic word properties, phonological word forms, and their phonetic gestures? (3) If large neuron ensembles are the basis of such processes, how can one expect these populations to be connected? (4) In particular, how could one-way, reciprocal, and numbered connections be realized? and, (5) How can a neuroscientific approach for multiple access to the same word in the course of the production of a sentence? Footnotes1 This commentary originally appeared in the Levelt et al. treatment in BBS 22(1) (pp. 52–54).

A unifing theory of spatiotemporal brain dynamics should incorporate multiple spatial and temporal scales. Between the microscopic (local) and macroscopic (global) components proposed by Nunez, mesoscopic (intermediate-range) elements should be integral parts of models. The corresponding mathematical formalism requires tools of nonlinear dynamics and the use of aperiodic (chaotic) attractors. Some relations between local-mesoscopic and mesoscopic-global components are outlined.

Substantially increased international financial mobility and internal financial reforms in many countries have led to apparently increased volatility of their financial markets. This heightened volatility has sometimes been associated with rapid increases or decreases in asset values that many observers suspect contain elements of speculative bubbles and their associated crashes, not justified by rational expectations of underlying fundamentals. In addition, these possible bubbles may coincide with nonlinear dynamics beyond basic ARCH effects, thus being nonlinear speculative bubbles.

This essay explores the metaphorical use of the area of nonlinear dynamics popularly known as "chaos theory," surveying its use in one particular field: legal theory. After sketching some of the mistakes encountered in these efforts, I outline the possibility of the fruitful use of nonlinear dynamics for thinking about our legal system. I then offer some general lessons to be drawn from these examples-both cautionary maxims and a limited defense of cross-disciplinary borrowing. I conclude with some reflections on the nature of arguments that seek to establish intellectual authority or epistemic merit by analogical reasoning.

Although one can endorse the complexity of the data and processes that Phillips & Singer (P&S) review, their mathematical suggestions can be compared critically with cases in nonlinear psychophysics, where the theoretician is faced with analogous problems. Owing to P&S's failure adequately to recognise both the intricate properties of nonlinear dynamics in networks and the constraints of metabolic demands on the temporal generation of patterns in biological nets their conclusions fail to meet the problems they properly address.

Three principles of dialectical analysis are examined in terms of nonlinear dynamics models. The three principles are the transformation of quantity into quality, the interpenetration of opposites, and the negation of the negation. The first two of these especially are interpreted within the frameworks of catastrophe, chaos, and emergent dynamics complexity theoretic models, with the concept of bifurcation playing a central role. Problems with this viewpoint are also discussed.

An impressive review of brain neurophysiology provides the basis for modelling the dynamics of transmission in neural circuits, using appropriate nonlinear mathematics. The coverage is unbalanced, however: the parallel dynamics at the level of behaviour and sensory-cognitive processes are sparsely addressed, so the final chapter fails to indicate the complexity and subtlety of relevant modern work.