Essentialism vs. essentialism

In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press (2002)
Abstract I argue that the key motivation for the essentialist is that modal intuitions, such as "Humphrey might have won", are not to be explicated in terms of persons in other possible situations who are similar to the actual Humphrey. However, because of a need to preserve the necessity of identity, the essentialist must claim that certain other intuitions (such as "Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus") have to be understood in terms of similarity (as in Kripke) or have to be rejected (as in Yablo). This move leads to ineliminable doubts about the essentialist's rejection of similarity, and so it leads to an undermining of the motivation for essentialism itself.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,875
External links This entry has no external links. Add one.
Through your library Configure

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index

2009-06-22

Total downloads

0

Recent downloads (6 months)

0

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums