Essentialism vs. essentialism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 223--252 (2002)
I argue that the key motivation for the essentialist is that modal intuitions, such as "Humphrey might have won", are not to be explicated in terms of persons in other possible situations who are similar to the actual Humphrey. However, because of a need to preserve the necessity of identity, the essentialist must claim that certain other intuitions (such as "Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus") have to be understood in terms of similarity (as in Kripke) or have to be rejected (as in Yablo). This move leads to ineliminable doubts about the essentialist's rejection of similarity, and so it leads to an undermining of the motivation for essentialism itself.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
George Masterton (2012). Physical Necessity is Not Necessity Tout Court. Metaphysica 13 (2):175-182.
Similar books and articles
Marc Ereshefsky (2010). What's Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):674-685.
Jerzy Gołosz (2005). Structural Essentialism and Determinism. Erkenntnis 63 (1):73 - 100.
Iain Thomson (2000). What's Wrong with Being a Technological Essentialist? A Response to Feenberg. Inquiry 43 (4):429 – 444.
Charlotte Witt (2011). What Is Gender Essentialism? In Feminist Metaphysics. Springer Verlag. 11--25.
Maja Malec (2009). Essentialism Contextualized. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):201-217.
Michael Strevens (2000). The Essentialist Aspect of Naive Theories. Cognition 74 (149):175.
Added to index2009-06-22
Total downloads3 ( #344,841 of 1,692,428 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #78,120 of 1,692,428 )
How can I increase my downloads?