David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studia Logica 79 (1):97 - 113 (2005)
One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information.
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Mathematical Logic and Foundations Computational Linguistics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Allard Tamminga (2003). A Critical Exposition of Isaac Levi's Epistemology. Logique Et Analyse 183:447-478.
Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky (1996). Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment. Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.
Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco (1999). Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery). Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
Ingvar Johansson (1998). Hume's Surprise and the Logic of Belief Changes. Synthese 117 (2):275-291.
Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
Anthony S. Gillies (2006). What Might Be the Case After a Change in View. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (2):117 - 145.
Oliver Schulte (1999). Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle. Synthese 118 (3):329-361.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #177,589 of 1,410,031 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,059 of 1,410,031 )
How can I increase my downloads?