Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 154 (2):231-257 (2007)
|Abstract||I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark Risjord (1996). Meaning, Belief, and Language Acquisition. Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):465-475.
C. J. L. Talmage (1994). Literal Meaning, Conventional Meaning and First Meaning. Erkenntnis 40 (2):213 - 225.
Abdur Razzaque (1996). The Theory of Meaning. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 3 (3):24-28.
Eva Feder Kittay (1984). The Identification of Metaphor. Synthese 58 (2):153 - 202.
Finn Bostad (ed.) (2004). Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language and Culture: Meaning in Language, Art, and New Media. Palgrave Macmillan.
Christopher Gauker (1995). A New Skeptical Solution. Acta Analytica 113 (14):113-129.
Markus Schrenk (2008). Verificationist Theory of Meaning. In U. Windhorst, M. Binder & N. Hirowaka (eds.), Encyclopaedic Reference of Neuroscience. Springer.
Neil Levy (2005). Downshifting and Meaning in Life. Ratio 18 (2):176–189.
Stephen R. Schiffer (1972). Meaning. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2006). Ontology in the Theory of Meaning. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):325 – 335.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #43,627 of 751,919 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,969 of 751,919 )
How can I increase my downloads?