Ontology and teleofunctions: A defense and revision of the systematic account of teleological explanation
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 150 (1):69 - 98 (2006)
I defend and revise the systematic account of normative functions (teleofunctions), as recently developed by Gerhard Schlosser and by W. D. Christensen and M. H. Bickhard. This account proposes that teleofunctions are had by structures that play certain kinds of roles in complex systems. This theory is an alternative to the historical etiological account of teleofunctions, developed by Ruth Millikan and others. The historical etiological account is susceptible to a general ontological problem that has been under-appreciated, and that offers important reasons to adopt the systematic account. However, the systematic account must be revised to allow for two distinct kinds of teleofunctions in order to avoid another ontological problem.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Paul W. Taylor (2011). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton University Press.
Paul M. Churchland (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.
Ruth G. Millikan (1993). White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge: MIT Press.
J. A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
Citations of this work BETA
Kepa Ruiz-Mirazo & Alvaro Moreno (2012). Autonomy in Evolution: From Minimal to Complex Life. Synthese 185 (1):21-52.
Sune Holm (2012). Biological Interests, Normative Functions, and Synthetic Biology. Philosophy and Technology 25 (4):525-541.
Daniel Mark Kraemer (2013). Normativity From an Organizational Perspective. Biological Theory 9 (3):1-5.
Craig Stephen Delancey (2007). Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language. Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
Sune Holm (2013). Organism and Artifact: Proper Functions in Paley Organisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):706-713.
Similar books and articles
John Forge (1985). Theoretical Explanation in Physical Science. Erkenntnis 23 (3):269 - 294.
Kai Draper (2009). Defense. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):69 - 88.
Michael Strevens (2008). Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press.
Marc Artiga (2010). Learning and Selection Processes. Theoria 25 (2):197-209.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons. In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press 13--33.
David Papineau (1990). Truth and Teleology. In D. Knowles (ed.), Explanation and its Limits. Cambridge University Press 21-43.
Sandra D. Mitchell (1995). Function, Fitness and Disposition. Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):39-54.
Matteo Mossio, Cristian Saborido & Alvaro Moreno (2009). An Organizational Account of Biological Functions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):813-841.
John Turri (2011). The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #130,028 of 1,789,835 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #122,398 of 1,789,835 )
How can I increase my downloads?