Phenomenal experience and the measure of information
Erkenntnis 66 (3):329 - 352 (2007)
| Abstract | This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson. | |||||||||
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