Phenomenal experience and the measure of information

Erkenntnis 66 (3):329 - 352 (2007)
Abstract
This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson.
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References found in this work BETA
David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science: Conceptual and Empirical Issues 2 (3):200-19.

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